On this point, the only evidence presented by Marvell during the relevant period (from Augto March 6, 2003) consists of several entries contained in privilege logs dated in September and December of 2002. As to constructive knowledge, “he plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the facts already known by him were such as to put upon a man of ordinary intelligence the duty of inquiry.” Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. Marvell does not argue that CMU had actual knowledge of its infringement of either the ‘180 Patent or the ‘839 Patent (to the extent it remains relevant) but focuses on CMU’s alleged constructive knowledge of infringement at that time. “Marvell’s arguments as to the applicability of the presumption are rejected by the Court because it has not pointed to any significant evidence of CMU’s alleged knowledge of its infringement of the ‘180 Patent between Augand March 6, 2003.
The district court rejected Marvell’s argument regarding the presumption of laches. Marvell points to various events which occurred in 1998, 20 in support of its efforts to invoke the presumption. The district court noted that “he first issue in dispute between the parties is whether Marvell has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that CMU had actual or constructive knowledge of Marvell’s infringement of the patents prior to March 6, 2003, which would raise a presumption in favor of Marvell. After a four-week jury trial, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of CMU on infringement, validity, and willfulness, and awarded damages in the amount of $1,169,140,271.00.Īmong many post-trial motions, Marvell file a motion for judgment in its favor on the equitable defense of laches. (collectively “Marvell”), CMU alleged that Marvell has infringed two of its patents. In this patent infringement case brought by Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”), against Marvell Technology Group, Ltd.